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In this chapter I argue that we can start to extend political ideas to other entities within the Earth 
through deploying an intermediary concept such as ‘memory’.  In the domain of human politics, there 
has been much attention to the role of collective memory in the politics of recognition and justice – 
but also the role that active forgetting can play in creating the conditions for progressive social change. 
What about the politics of the Earth? Natural scientists sometimes us the word ‘memory’ to describe 
biological or even geophysical process: they talk of ‘climate memory’, or ‘ecological memory’, or 
materials as having ‘shape memory’.  But what would happen if we took such usages seriously, and 
applied the idea of memory to a complex entity like a planet?  How could the Earth be said to 
remember and to forget?  What memory systems has the Earth evolved in its 4.5 billion-year 
‘geostory’?  And if the Earth is indeed entering ‘the Anthropocene’, a new geological epoch in which 
humans are the determining geological force, how might the Anthropocene be inserting itself into the 
memory systems of the Earth?  Might thinking of the Earth as something that remembers and forgets 
change the way that we think about this thing we call the Anthropocene, what it is and what it means? 
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In the spirit of continuing and radicalising the Copernican project of displacing the human from the 
centre of things, there have been a number of attempts in recent decades to extend ideas of politics 
to the Earth itself.  Most of these attempts can be said to have fallen into what Quentin Meillassoux 
criticises as ‘correlationism’, ‘the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation 
between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other’ (Meillassoux, 
2008: 5).  A correlationist position on the relation between the political and the planetary would be to 
say that, even if we can extend politics away from the human to embrace the planetary preconditions 
for human’s political agency (Grosz et al., 2017) then human subjectivity must somewhere be part of 
the chain.  Even Bruno Latour’s ‘Parliament of things’ seems to need humans to represent the ‘things-
in-themselves’ (Latour, 1993).  But can we go further?  If we define the political as that specific mode 
of existence characterised by what Hannah Arendt (1958) called plurality and natality,2 can we speak 
of a politics of the Earth in which humans and human subjectivity are not central – and sometimes 
even wholly absent?  Perhaps counterintuitively, I will suggest that we can get further in such a task if 
we attempt to extend not one but two concepts beyond their usual anthropocentric boundaries.  In 
this chapter I will thus explore a triangular relation: amongst the political, Earth processes and 
memory.   
There have been many debates recently about the importance for political processes of 
memory – particularly collective memory.  Generally, the argument has been that memory plays an 
important role in struggles for justice, and that organised forgetting is an ideological strategy used by 
the powerful to suppress historical claims against injustice and dispossession.  However, as we shall 
see, there have also been counterarguments that memory can sometimes play a regressive role, and 
that forms of forgetting can be an important precondition for progressive politics.  In what follows I 
will relate these debates to the more-than-human, arguing not only that we can extend the debates 
about politics and memory to the geophysical realm, but also that a planetary understanding of 
memory can perhaps help us better understand its role in human society. 
In a recent debate about how memory studies can respond to the new context of the 
Anthropocene – the proposed new geological epoch in which humans are the determining geological 
force (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000) – Richard Crownshaw (2014: 175) argues that ‘memory studies 
need to adopt a posthumanist stance, otherwise it will be circumscribed by the normative theorization 
of memory’s symbolic reconstitution of human life and human worlds’.  Michael Rothberg (2017: 514) 
similarly suggests that ‘a radically non-anthropocentric multidirectional memory would need to move 
off the grid of human(ist) comparison and ethics’.  However, Rothberg (2017: 515) goes on to suggest 
that he is ‘not yet ready to give up the [human] subject of memory and political responsibility’, 
suggesting that there are ethical as well as epistemological reasons for remaining within the bounds 
of correlationism.  Can we extend concepts of memory and politics beyond the humanist subject, while 
still retaining the power of these ideas to do important critical work? 
I will explore this question through placing the event of the Anthropocene in the context of 
how the Earth can be said to remember and to forget.  What memory systems has the Earth evolved 
in what Bruno Latour calls its 4.5 billion-year ‘geostory’?  In the context of this story, is the 
Anthropocene to be thought of as just another layer, inserted into the ‘rock memory’ of the Earth?  
Or does it actually change the Earth’s powers of remembering and forgetting?  Once informed by an 
awareness of the relationship between memory and politics, might thinking of the Earth as something 
that remembers and forgets change the way that we think about this thing we call the Anthropocene, 
what it is and what it means? 
 
Stretching memory 
Let me first sketch what I think are the necessary characteristics of a concept of memory that might 
be adequate to the task of embracing Earth processes.  Let us undergo a theoretical ‘memory test’ – 
a test of our conception of memory, to see how suited it is for our purpose. 
Firstly, we need to find a way of talking about memory in a way that easily crosses any 
imagined boundary between the ideational (semiotic) and the material (physical), the living and the 
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non-living and so on.  It will not be enough simply to use memory metaphorically, extending by analogy 
from what we understand about human and more generally animal memory to the wider material 
world, thereby weakening the power of the concept of memory to do useful intellectual and political 
work. Instead, let us try to think of human memory as just a specific example of a wider phenomenon.  
Saying that some entity or process ‘exhibits memory’ need not commit us to regarding it as a subject, 
as having mind or consciousness, or even as being a unified, bounded entity; it may be that conscious, 
sentient, bounded living things that are aware of themselves as a subject are merely one kind of thing 
that can remember and forget. 
Secondly, any deployment of the concept of memory needs to take account of the different 
forms that memory can take.  Memory can be weak or strong in different ways – duration, resolution, 
recallability, and so on – and also have different qualitative characters. With human memory, we can 
identify some major distinctions between classes of memory process that are likely to be useful when 
looking beyond the human.  One class involves what Edmund Husserl (1991) called ‘primary retention’, 
the immediate awareness of the unfolding of time in the present experience of duration, change and 
motion.  In this class would belong what Henri Bergson (1959), and later Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
(1962), theorised as ‘habitual body memory’ – the slow, cumulative ‘sedimentation’ through 
repetition which builds the depth of the body’s often unconscious experience of its milieu and of its 
own possibilities of action.  By contrast, Husserl’s ‘secondary retention’ involve cognition and 
imagination about more distant moments in time; here belongs what Bergson calls ‘recollective 
memory’, and contemporary psychologists ‘episodic memory’, where past events that happened at a 
particular place and time are ‘recalled’, often in less embodied and more representational and 
imagistic modes; here perhaps also belongs ‘working memory’, where selected information is selected 
and temporarily held to be used in complex cognitive tasks.  If we generalise memory beyond the 
human, and beyond the living, then it is likely that these categories of memory will have to be wildly 
modified; but we can be pretty sure that some comparable set of distinctions will have to be made. 
Thirdly, memory is in some sense an autorelation. As Gilles Deleuze puts it, following 
Immanuel Kant,  ‘[m]emory is the real name of the relation to oneself, or the affect on self by self’ 
(Deleuze, 1988: 107).  So memory is something topological, about the shape, in some sense, of the 
entity or assemblage that is said to have memory, how it is temporally folded, made to affect and be 
affected by itself across time.  Memory is thus an aspect of ‘the shape of time’ (Kubler, 1962) – time, 
that is, that is understood not as a universal background or container for events but as generated by 
the specific ways that different entities come into existence, evolve and endure. 
Fourthly, memory also includes forgetting.  But forgetting is not just privative, the lack of 
memory.  Just as only living things can die (and indeed certain kinds of death are only available to 
certain kinds of living things), only things that can remember can forget, in any interesting sense. 
Forgetting is an active process, a capacity, a skill.  And as we will see the creation of specific kinds of 
memory can require forgetting, selection, erasure.   
Fifthly, if memory is about autoaffection, as Deleuze puts it, at least some forms of memory 
have to be active and constitutive, affecting how something is able to react to its environment.  And 
here again forgetting may be as important as remembering for the ability of an entity to act.  As well 
as hypomnesia – forgetting, or under-remembering – there is hypermnesia, over-remembering, of 
which Nietzsche accused the ancient Greeks.3 In order to act, the individual has to overcome the 
stifling nature of history by recovering the powers of the pre-historical animal to forget – to develop 
a memory of the future (Nietzsche, 2006). We will have to ask whether the Earth can have a ‘memory 
of the future’ that enables it to act in surprising ways. 
 
Memory and the political 
What is the political role of memory and forgetting in human society?  Paul Connerton (2009) makes 
the point that contemporary culture is at once hypomnesic and hypermnesic.  On the one hand, the 
structures of the political economy are organised around forgetting.  With craft production replaced 
by mass production, and the diachrony of work replaced by synchrony of exchange value; the mass-
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produced commodity is stripped of individual acts of making in a sustained act of forgetting.  The 
commodity form itself, as analysed by Marx, could be said to depend on organised forgetting.  
Similarly, as ‘all that is solid melts into air’, the ‘memory places’ that provide people with mnemonic 
structures which sustain cultural memory and identity are stripped away.  On the other hand, despite 
– and in fact maybe because – of the hypomnesia of our political economy, contemporary cultural 
production is hypermnesic in its obsessive production and hoarding of information and signs.  
In recent debates there has been an emphasis on the way that the domination of one society 
or one group by another often involves the destruction of memory.  For example, Johannes Fabian 
points out how the colonisation of Africa by European powers involved the systematic erasure of the 
memory practices of local cultures (Fabian, 2007).  Norman Klein (1998) uses Los Angeles as a proxy 
for capitalist spaces in general, analysing the selective way that the past is preserved or erased as 
urban spaces develop over time under commercial pressures.  But sometimes too much memory can 
weigh on the present; an excess of memory can produce trauma, revenge and war (Rieff, 2016).   
Jacques Derrida famously warned us that sometimes the drive to remember – to store up 
memories in an indestructible form – can result in the opposite effect.  Because of the fragility and 
vulnerability of live or spontaneous memory (mneme or anamnesis), the archive tries to protect 
memory from destruction by incarcerating it in a memory prosthetic (Derrida, 1995: 22).  But of course 
the hypermnesia of the archive contains within itself a vulnerability.  The archive repeats, and 
repetition is an aspect of the death drive, of the very destruction which the archive is trying to resist.  
The archive works against itself and can be a form of forgetting – this is the mal d'archive, (Derrida, 
1995: 14).  But hypomnesia can take other forms, and for these we need to turn to Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s reflections on the different modalities of human memory.   
In Nietzsche’s philosophical anthropology, the phenomenon of the human arises with the 
advent of the historical mode of being – of long-term, culturally mediated memory.  However, 
wherever there is an excess of history the human ceases to be once again (Nietzsche, 2006: 128).  The 
human thus needs both the historical and the unhistorical to be free, and becoming unhistorical 
involves forgetting. “It is possible to live almost without memory … but without forgetting, it is utterly 
impossible to live at all’ (Nietzsche, 2006: 127).  Nietzsche insists that he would only serve history if it 
would serve life; and the form of remembering that can serve life is always an active process that 
includes forgetting, that he understands as a form of selective retention (Nietzsche, 1967: 57). In ‘On 
the utility and liability of history for life’, Nietzsche describes three modes of history or cultural 
memory: the antiquarian, deployed by those who would preserve and revere the past; the critical, for 
those in need of liberation; and the monumental history for those who act and strive.  He insists that 
all three of these forms of cultural memory are selective, must serve the needs of the present. Here 
Nietzsche is anticipating the findings of psychological memory studies; acts of misremembering and 
forgetting are themselves active too, and related closely to identity and the ability to persist as a being 
capable of action (Schacter et al., 2003).   
In his Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche went on to describe forgetting as a positive faculty of 
repression that acts as a ‘door keeper’ between the memory (the retaining of impressions) and the 
will, and thus as necessary for psychic health and the ability to act.   He likens the person who cannot 
forget to a dyspeptic or constipated person, one who cannot ‘have done’ with anything. By contrast, 
for Nietzsche a healthy person, one who can forget, has a memory of the will, one that does not merely 
record the past but ordains the future (Nietzsche, 1967: 58; see also Deleuze, 1983: 112-3). In his 
explication of this Nietzsche here focuses on what he sees as the constitutive human power or right 
to make promises.4  Deleuze also observes that the memory proper to the human is the memory of 
the will, and of the future; Nietzsche’s free human recalls not the past moment of making a promise 
(in episodic memory) but the future moment in which that promise will be fulfilled (Deleuze, 1983: 




How the Earth remembers and forgets  
And so back to Earth.  Natural scientists frequently use ‘memory’ in a broadly analogical way to 
describe physical processes. For example, geologists talk of ‘lithospheric memory’, the way that events 
in deep time can have an enduring effect on current geological processes (e.g. Cloetingh et al., 2005); 
ecologists use ‘ecological memory’ to refer to material and informational legacies of earlier ecological 
disturbances that can affect the resilience of contemporary biota (e.g. Johnstone et al., 2016); and 
climatologists describe the way that current climate states such as temperature and humidity can 
exhibit longer term correlations as ‘climate memory’ (e.g. Koster and Suarez, 2001).  What is common 
to all of these is the use of ‘memory’ to describe situations where current and near future-states 
depend on, or in some way correlate with, not only the immediate past but deeper temporalities.  
Armed with our checklist from above, can we stretch our ideas of memory further and make this more 
than ‘mere’ analogy? 
Firstly, what are the modalities of planetary memory?5  How is memory stored?  We can divide 
the modalities of planetary memory roughly into three groups.  The first involves forms of energy, 
such as the kinetic energy of motion, the thermal energy of relative temperature, or the chemical 
energy stored in molecular bonds.  thus the Earth itself can be said to remember the processes of its 
formation not least in the form of the residual heat trapped and slowly leaking out from the planet’s 
interior. The second involves matter – here, for example, fluids can carry a memory of dissolved or 
suspended substances, such as moisture or anthropogenic chemicals.  The third involves space: the 
very shape, location or arrangement of something can constitute a form of information which can act 
as a form of memory. All of these modalities have their own specific powers of persistence, but also 
of transmission and influence: motion, temperature, composition, shape and location can all be 
passed from object to object, substance to substance.   
Secondly, given the material carriers of memory, what are its wider thermodynamic 
preconditions?  Memory in any interesting sense has to be understood as a phenomenon that occurs 
on the borderline between ordered and chaotic regimes (Kauffman, 1993).  On the one hand, highly 
ordered systems may be unable to make new memories – or may be able to lay them down but be 
unable to ‘read’ or use them to alter their behaviour.  On the other hand, chaotic systems are so 
reactive to any stimulus that they cannot remember anything over all but the shortest timescales.  It 
is in what Kauffman calls the ‘complex regime’ at the boundary between the ordered and chaotic 
regimes, between hypermnesis (memory turned up too far) and hypomnesis (memory turned down 
too far) that the powers of memory can most fully be realised (Kauffman, 1993: 174).   
Thirdly, if memory is autoaffection, an aspect of the internal time of things in which they affect 
themselves over time, can we use this to specify more closely the kind of temporal patterns 
characteristic of memory processes in a dense, complex, differentiated assemblage such as the Earth?  
Here we can use the concept of ‘noise’, defined as signal produced by a stochastic process and thus 
containing frequencies that range continuously in value. The noise characteristic of different kinds of 
phenomena can be spectrally decomposed into different power spectra, named after different 
‘colours’, by analogy with ‘white noise’ which, like white light, has a flat frequency spectrum. 
In noise terms, hypermnesis corresponds to black noise – an absolute memory where present 
states totally correspond to and thus can be used to calculate past and future events.  The motion of 
planetary bodies in the vacuum can be seen as hypermnesic in this sense, as they follow the ellipses, 
parabolas and hyperbolas of gravitational motion, guided by the absolute memory of reversible 
Newtonian mechanics. As Prigogine and Stengers put it, the planets like all objects of classical 
dynamics already know everything they need to know in order to move along their orbits, and can 
never forget it (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984, pp. 305–6).6  On the other hand, hypomnesia, extreme 
forgetfulness, corresponds to white noise.  White noise can be produced by a memoryless process 
known as a ‘Markov chain’ – a chain of events when the probability of each possible event depends 
only on the immediately prior state.   Information is lost and entropy increases. In fact a Markov 
process has two chains of memory erasure – one extending into the future and one into the past; 
looking at the present tells us nothing about future states – but neither does it tell us anything about 
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past states (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984: 273).  This form of time is thus as reversible in its 
hypomnesic forgetting as the black noise of planetary motion is in its hypermnesic over-remembering.   
At first glance, intra-planetary memory processes look hypomnesic. In the dense media of 
fluid stellar and planetary compartments, and under far-from-equilibrium conditions, the perfect, 
reversible motion of the planets is all but impossible; inertia becomes not a form of memory as it is 
with planetary orbits but a source of forgetting, of dissipation, as moving entities diverge from their 
path in what Lucretius called the clinamen, losing not just their direction but their very motion in 
cascading eddies (Serres, 2000). However, planetary forgetting also forms the basis of new and very 
different powers of motion and memory, which break with the time symmetry shared by black and 
white noise.   Planets – gravitationally collapsed into their own gravity well, isolated in the vacuum, 
and subjected to flows of energy from sun and core – are bodies where the conditions favour the 
creation of information-rich pockets, where correlated states and motions can arise, endure and 
become more elaborate (Hidalgo, 2015).  
If the noise of absolute remembering is black noise, and the noise of absolute forgetting is 
white noise, then the noise characteristic of the complex regime of self-organisation is surely ‘pink 
noise’.  Pink noise, or 1/f noise, technically defined as a signal where power is inversely proportional 
to the frequency of the signal, is a shape of time in which long-term correlations dominate, and is 
characteristic of the self-organising processes of organic life (Szendro et al., 2001), human music (Voss 
and Clarke, 1978) – and surely social life too. 
Fourthly, what are the specific powers of memory characteristic of the different parts of the 
Earth?  Here, I only have space for some general observations about the role of the different phases 
of matter – solid, liquid and gas – in planetary memory. Planets such as the Earth are made up of 
chemically diverse, condensed, classical baryonic matter (i.e. ‘normal’ atoms), existing typically at a 
mid-range of temperatures between the cold of space and the huge temperatures of stars, and thus 
able to divide themselves into complex entities and regions with different powers and properties, 
which are then able to enter into diverse interactions with each other.  Planets are also gravitationally 
collapsed and differentiated, so that they form dense, approximately spherical bodies organised 
internally into different strata and compartments; from its solid core up to its gaseous atmosphere, 
the Earth is composed of regions of matter in different states, with different powers.  
Fluids are inherently hypomnesic, especially in terms of memory stored as motion or shape. 
As Derrida warned us, spontaneous, living memory, mneme, is vulnerable – fluid memory is wiped by 
dissipation, friction, viscosity and the weakness of fluid molecular bonds.  However, partly because of 
this hypomnesia, fluids are superb at creating form; liquids with moderate viscosity such as water are 
incessantly drawn to creating shapes such as spirals, waves, vortices, spheres and bells (Schwenk, 
1965).  In so far as fluids such as air have their own powers of remembering these take the form of a 
living, ‘oral’, or working memory – a memory of energy, stored in motion and intensivity, that has to 
be continually maintained in action or it almost literally evaporates.  For example, in some latitudes, 
air sometimes forms itself into dissipative systems (Prigogine and Glansdorff, 1971) such as cyclones 
and anti-cyclones, that maintain their identity and shape over time over a number of days by exporting 
entropy to their surroundings.   
Solids such as rock, by contrast, have ‘conformational’ memory – unlike fluids, they retain 
their shape, even when surrounding matter is removed.  But here we can be more precise about the 
specific ways that solids such as rock remember and forget across different timescales. Where rock is 
elastically deformed, such as a tectonic plate under applied stress, the rock retains the memory of its 
original shape.  The energy used to bend it is being stored in the molecular bonds.  In an earthquake 
the plates slip past each other, the stress is removed, and the rock springs back to its original shape.  
What an elastically deformed rock cannot remember is previous deformations and stresses – after 
each earthquake, the memory is reset.  Conversely, when rocks stretch beyond their elastic limit and 
fault, the energy is not stored in the molecular bonds but is used to change the shape of the rock.  This 
is an example of hysteresis, or path dependency – of irreversible time.  This is where lithospheric 
memory becomes both an archive of different deformation events, which can be read by an outside 
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observer, but also consequential in that it affects the behaviour of that geological formation in the 
future. 
Fifthly, how do planetary systems practice forms of transduction of memory?  In physics, 
‘transduction’ is used to refer to the conversion of one form of energy into another; in biology, it refers 
to the conversion of signals between different media.  Adrian Mackenzie (2002: 25) stretches the 
concept further, describing transduction as ‘a process whereby a disparity or difference is 
topologically and temporally restructured across some interface’.  For our purposes, memory 
transduction involves the restructuring of memory processes across an interface, in such a way that 
the modes of becoming of both entities or substances become entangled.  To speak of memory 
transduction is thus already to stretch the concept of memory beyond either the psychological or 
biological containment within the animal body, or even the more expansive definition of memory as 
autoaffection.   
Regarding human memory, ideas of transduction involve the recognition that memory resides 
not just in the individual mind and its organic substrate but is also redistributed across the social body 
in collective memory, or even placed in artefacts and inscriptions in the inorganic realm (Clark and 
Chalmers, 1998).  In contrast to the ‘engrams’ that are memories stored within the brain, Merlin 
Donald refers to external symbolic storage systems as involving containing ‘exograms’, in the form of 
visuosymbolic representations, oral memory and socially organised literacy, which overcome the 
limitations of biological memory, can be stored in a potentially unlimited range of physical media, and 
be accessed and retrieved through an expanded range of senses and pathways (Donald, 1991: 315). 
Thus the practice, for example, of placing things at the bottom of the stairs in order to remember to 
take them upstairs can be seen not just as an aid to memory, but as a form of memory itself – an act 
of delegation, in Latour’s language (1992), of distributed memory.  We can follow Bernard Stiegler 
(1998) by seeing ‘mnemotechnics’ as referring not just to deliberate techniques of memory, but also 
to the way that artefactuality and technicity in general is an exteriorisation of memory - that the 
equipmental assemblage of cups, stairs and pencils with which we are surrounded is part of how we 
remember who we are and what we know. 
With the expanded notion of memory that we developed above, we can start to see that 
mnemotechnics or memory transduction occurs not just between humans and humans, or humans 
and nonhumans, but amongst nonhuman and even non-living entities.  It is the general pattern of 
planetary evolution, of dividing and associating, that makes planetary mnemotechnics possible. Much 
of this is exchange between the different compartments of the Earth, which separated as the planet 
formed but are driven to be in close interaction by the far-from-equilibrium condition of planetary 
being.  The Earth in its differentiated layers is a ‘matryoshka doll’ of alternating solid and fluid volumes.  
Although there are good reasons to talk of the way that planetary differentiation makes possible the 
relative closure (in systems terms) of the different memory systems and their modalities, it also makes 
possible crucial processes of transduction between them.    
It is perhaps most markedly at the interfaces between the ‘sensitive chaos’ of fluid motion 
and the archival properties of solid durability that transductive processes occur in the Earth which 
ensure that differentiated planets become informationally complex bodies where correlated states 
and motions can arise, endure and become more elaborate (Hidalgo, 2015).  For example, in river 
basins the interaction between water and rock in processes of erosion and sedimentation helps water 
falling on the land to remember how to travel to the ocean, generating complex fractal networks that 
drain in optimal ways (Rodriǵuez-Iturbe and Rinaldo, 1997).  Similarly, the complex crust of the Earth, 
with its diverse minerals and concentration of metals in ores and deposits, arises from the 
transduction of memory processes between subterranean water’s powers to dissolve and transport 
different elements, and rock’s powers of retention. 
 
The Anthropocene as a memory event 
How does the Anthropocene as a geochronological event fit into my account of planetary memory?  
Let me first summarise where we have got to.  I suggested that we regard memory as autoaffection – 
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of the way that entities affect themselves across time; this means that specifying what kind of thing 
an entity is is already to specify what powers of memory it has.  We have also seen that memory takes 
diverse forms – working in different modalities, across different timescales and allowing an entity to 
affect itself in very different ways.  In terms of the politics of memory, we explored the complexity of 
the relationship between memory, forgetting and the political, seeing that one kind of forgetting – the 
erasure of collective memory – is a form of power over – but that other forms of forgetting can play a 
constitutive role in power to – the ability to become a political actor able to shape the future.  Put 
crudely, political agency thus manifests in the space between hypomnesia and hypermnesia, between 
too little and too much memory. 
We then turned to the more-than-human and saw that the powers of matter to organise itself 
also depend on finding that space between hypomnesia and hypermnesia.  We saw that the different 
parts and subsystems of the Earth support different memory systems, each of which can be said to 
have their own mnemic strengths and weaknesses.  For example, memories laid down in rock are like 
a great archive, but have the corresponding weaknesses of archived knowledge; only some of rock’s 
memories can be recalled by the rock itself, or by other parts of the Earth, and become part of the 
Earth’s ongoing ability to do new things.  The memory of the air is kinetic memory – oral, working 
memory, constantly creative and inventive in the generating of form – but also has the weaknesses of 
that form of memory, in its inherent vulnerability to be lost.  But we then saw that in the dense, 
differentiated body of the Earth, forms of transduction between its diverse memory systems enable 
it to take advantage of the diversity of its different memory systems, enabling it to become an ever-
more complex body, with diverse powers and potentialities.  
How can this journey through ideas of planetary memory help us think about the 
Anthropocene?  A detailed exploration of this is impossible here, but I can at least sketch out three 
complementary interpretations of the relationship between the Anthropocene and planetary memory 
– in effect, three research questions.  The first is to ask how the Anthropocene involves the laying 
down of new memories; this indeed is the focus of the Anthropocene Working Group, which has to 
see even forgetting as the laying down of a trace, in terms of lithostratigraphic, chemostratigraphic 
and biostratigraphic signals that might be discerned in a future rock series by an imagined geologist 
(Williams et al., 2016).  The second involves asking how the Anthropocene is potentially a scrambling 
of the memory systems of the Earth, not just for observers, but for the Earth itself, so that it forgets 
what it knows, and maybe loses the ability to make and use new memories, to learn and to develop 
new powers.  Such a way of framing the Anthropocene can help us clarify many of our deeper ethical 
intuitions concerning the physical changes that the Earth is undergoing such as biodiversity loss.  The 
third would be to ask whether what we are struggling to name at the moment is in fact the Earth also 
adding new memory systems, in the form of the technosphere, the evolving interconnected system of 
technical artefacts (Haff, 2014). 
As we move through these three research questions, we should recall what Derrida wrote in 
‘Archive fever’ (Derrida, 1995). Whether it is the very strata of the rock, or an archive created by 
humans in order to record Earth’s memories and what it knows, the archive’s very form of resistance 
to forgetting makes a more final forgetting possible – the hiding or destruction of the archive. The 
closed archive of the solid body of the Earth is now being opened but at the same time ransacked.  
Which kind of memory is strongest? Which will last the longest and be most consequential in the 
Anthropocene? When we remember the Earth, and remember for the Earth, should we remember as 
a mountain, as a great archive?  Or as a storm, a vortex, a howl, as living memory?  Which kind of 
memory – and which kind of forgetting – will enable the Earth to act in the way in which it needs to 
act at this time?   
 
Notes 
1 I would like to thank Nigel Clark, Piers Foster, Andy Jarvis, Wolfgang Lucht and Adam Bobette for conversations 
which have greatly helped me in the ideas in this paper – though I have to take responsibility for the way that I 
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have brought them together.  An earlier version of this paper, ‘The Anthropocene and the memory of the Earth’, 
was presented at the colloquium The Thousand Names of Gaia: From the Anthropocene to the Age of the Earth, 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 15-19 September 2014. 
2 These were the two features that Arendt sees as most constitutive of the human as a political animal: plurality, 
the uniqueness of humans (that ‘men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world’), and natality, human 
beings’ capacity to initiate radically new things in the world (Arendt, 1958: 7). 
3 I am using this term in a different way to Bernard Steigler (1998), who uses ‘hypermnesia’ as another name for 
the exteriorisation or transduction of memory. 
4 This idea was later taken up by Hannah Arendt in her analysis of the human condition.  For Arendt, the plurality 
of human perspectives make the results of meaningful human action – speech or gesture – inherently 
unpredictable and irreversible (in geophysical terms, we would say turbulent). But this inherent irreversibility 
and unpredictability can be tamed through specific forms of action through binding speech acts such as 
promising (in which the future is secured) and forgiving (in which the past is reversed) (Arendt, 1958). 
5 Here I am setting aside the more obvious memory modalities of arbitrary codes stored in DNA, culture and 
language or computational machines; these too need to be analysed as forms of planetary memory but there is 
not space to do that here. 
6 Of course as with all things planetary this is relative to a particular time scale. 
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